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Abstract: In this article I examine the relation between the philosophies of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Gilles Deleuze by looking at the way they refer 
to the time theory of Henri Bergson. It appears that, although Merleau-Ponty 
develops some fundamental Bergsonian insights on the nature of time, he 
presents himself as a critical reader of the latter. I will show that although Mer-
leau-Ponty’s interpretation of Bergson differs fundamentally from Deleuze’s 
interpretation, Merleau-Ponty’s “corrections” of Bergson’s theory fit Deleuze’s 
reading of Bergson very well. This indicates a similarity with respect to what is 
at stake in the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze. The critical refer-
ence that Deleuze makes to Merleau-Ponty’s conception of cinema and thus of 
movement is hence not justified, but is the result of a selective and prototypi-
cal reading of the early Merleau-Ponty.
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Introduction
The general impression among Deleuze’s readers is that Deleuze had no 
patience for phenomenology. Many of his references to phenomenology, and 
especially to the general orientation of phenomenological inquiry, are dispar-
aging. There are some scholars, however, such as Alain Beaulieu, who believe 
that phenomenology is Deleuze’s invisible enemy, the adversary he needs in 
order to develop his own thought. And he invokes a Nietzschean idea to char-
acterize Deleuze’s antagonism to phenomenology: contrary to a war, a combat 
does not imply the suppression of one’s opponent, but always presupposes 
some respect for—and even love of—the enemy, because one shares in the 
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strength and excellence of one’s enemy. Beaulieu thus calls phenomenology 
Deleuze’s “beloved enemy” or “friend-enemy”.1
While I do not deny Deleuze’s antagonistic relation to phenomenology, I 
would like to examine what “love” or “friendship” there is within this couple 
and, more particularly between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty. There  what is 
at stake in both philosophies, and the ways in which they express their phi-
losophies. One way of exploring these similarities is by examining how both 
authors read and use Henri Bergson, a philosopher they knew very well and 
referred to often in their own work. In this article, I will focus on Bergson’s 
theory of time. This famous theory could  not be absent in the temporal-
ity chapter of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception or from Deleuze’s 
books on cinema, which are an examination of how cinema presents time. I 
believe that an examination of how both thinkers rework Bergson’s theory of 
time,which ideas they attack, and how they adapt them, can reveal something 
about the similarities and differences in their positions.
Deleuze’s  discussion of Bergson’s theory of time
It may seem at first sight that the whole project of using Bergson to look 
for resonances between Merleau-Ponty’s and Deleuze’s conceptions of time is 
threatened by the following statement from Deleuze: 
It was necessary, at any cost, to overcome this duality of image and movement, 
of consciousness and thing. Two very different authors were to undertake this 
task at about the same time: Bergson and Husserl. Each had his own war cry: 
all consciousness is consciousness of something (Husserl), or more strongly, all 
consciousness is something (Bergson).2 
According to Deleuze, Bergson’s attempt to overcome the “duality” of im-
age (or consciousness) and movement (or body) is fundamentally cinemato-
graphic, whereas Husserl’s phenomenological attempt has to be considered 
pre-cinematographic. Bergson’s strategy, in other words, is radically different 
from phenomenology’s. Why is that? 
1 “Unlike the warrior, the combatant is not simply satisfied with suppressing his opponent. 
He increases his own power through the productive appropriation of the power of his van-
quished opponent. The stronger the opponent is, the more likely it is that the combatant can 
increase his own power.” (A. Beaulieu, Gilles Deleuze et la phénoménologie, Mons: Les Editions 
Sils Maria, 2004, p. 261, transl. mine) See also: “Consequently, phenomenology is Deleuze’s 
friend because it is an extrinsic point capable of giving consistency to his philosophical project; 
but it is also an implicit enemy, without which Deleuze’s thought would remain abstract.” 
(ibid., p. 11)  The notions of “beloved enemy” and  “friend-enemy” are further discussed on p. 
257 and p. 260, respectively
2 G. Deleuze, Cinema 1. The Movement-Image, English trans. by H. Tomlinson and B. 
Habberjam), London/New York: The Athlone Press, 1986, [1983], p. 56 [pp. 83-84]. Hence-
forward abbreviated as C1.
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The image, which Bergson defines as something that acts and reacts on 
other images in every one of its elementary parts,3 is central to Bergson’s argu-
ment. An image is thus defined by the movements it undergoes and exerts; 
an image is nothing more than movement. Since for Bergson both things and 
consciousness are images, the dualism between them is dissolved. And since 
moving images are the instruments of cinema, Deleuze argues that this over-
coming of dualism is cinematographic.4 
Bergson’s overcoming of dualism issues in a theory of movement. And it is 
here, exactly, that Deleuze situates the core difference between Bergson’s anti-
dualism and phenomenology’s. Bergson holds that movement has nothing to 
do with a thing’s transition from one position in space to another; such a view, 
he argues, denies movement any creative character. After all, according to that 
view, the moved thing only differs from the unmoved thing in that it occupies 
a different spatio-temporal position. Time is thus reduced to a homogeneous 
line—it is the same at all moments and evolves linearly—on which things 
can occupy different places. Time is an independent variable. It is spatialized 
because it is understood as the juxtaposition of arbitrary (because exchange-
able), immobile and external moments or, as Deleuze calls it, of “any-instants-
whatever.”5 Bergson, on the contrary, believes that moments do differ, that 
is, that they can evolve towards a qualitatively different state. Every figure 
has its particular or singular movement or inner becoming. Moreover, time 
is what makes things change in a qualitative way; time is change, movement, 
3 H. Bergson, Matter and Memory, English trans. by N.M. Paul, and W.S. Palmer, New 
York: Dover Publications, 2004 [1939], p. 28 [p. 33]. 
4 Bergson himself would never have used this characterization since he condemns cinema 
for reconstituting movement in an improper way, i.e., by making immobile sections or images 
succeed one another (H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, English trans. by A. Mitchell, New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1924 [1941], p. 305-306 [p. 304-306]). Deleuze’s innovation con-
sists in combining Bergson’s analysis of movement with a new, non-Bergsonian understanding 
of cinema. According to Deleuze, cinema presents us with real movement exactly because it 
uses sections or any-moments-whatever. What Bergson notices about scientific any-moments-
whatever, but which he refused to transpose to cinema, is that these any-moments-whatever 
indicate that the movement of which they are the terms is not existentially or essentially pre-
determined; they determine movement immanently and materially. Contrary to Bergson, De-
leuze thinks that cinematographic moments have a qualitative nature (C1, p. 8 [pp. 18-19]). 
These qualities are the result of movements of translation between the moments, such that the 
whole changes. It is thus not so much the moments themselves but the relations between them 
that determine the qualities (i.e., the so-called externality of the relation to its terms). In her 
article “Deleuze and the Limits of Mathematical Time”, Dorothea Olkowski identifies two 
more divergences between Deleuze’s and Bergson’s theory of time: Deleuze gives short shrift to 
Bergson’s idea that “there is no duration without consciousness and no before and after without 
memory,” and to Bergson’s notion that the body and its affectivity are situated outside the plane 
of immanence (D. Olkowski, “Deleuze and the Limits of Mathematical Time,” in Deleuze 
Studies, vol. 2, n° 1, p. 14). 
5 C1, p. 4 [p. 13].
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creation. In Bergson’s terms: there exists a duration immanent to the whole 
of the universe and this duration has to be understood as “invention, the 
creation of new forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new.”6 The 
impersonal, abstract and simple movements examined by modern sciences are 
just deductions of that. 
Apart from the spatialized view of time initiated by the modern scienc-
es of nature7,Bergson mentions another “wrong” conception of movement, 
namely, the one offered by the ancient Greeks. The Greeks, like the moderns, 
do not ascribe a constitutive value to time; instead, they conceive time, again 
like the moderns, as being neutral. Ultimately, what matters to the Greeks are 
infinite and immobile Essences or Ideas, such that movement is reduced to 
the transition between these Essences. Movement is the “regulated transition 
from one form to another, that is, an order of poses or privileged instants.”8 
Time is only the frame necessary to think this transition. But it is irrelevant in 
itself—it has no direct influence on the essences. 
Deleuze situates Merleau-Ponty in the same tradition as the Greeks. Mer-
leau-Ponty also understands movement as the passage of immobile, privileged 
moments, except that, for him, these moments are no longer essential but 
existential. He does not invoke intelligible forms but perceivable Gestalts that 
organize our field of perception in accordance with our being-towards-the-
world, such that this being-towards-the-world constitutes the fixed anchor-
point of perception9. For Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty’s neutral conception of 
time does not accord time any effective power; Merleau-Ponty’s (and phe-
nomenology’s) anti-dualism cannot be put on a par with Bergson’s.
Is Deleuze’s presentation of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of time correct? 
Is Merleau-Ponty’s conception as different from Deleuze’s as we might think 
it is, given the difference between Merleau-Ponty and Bergson mentioned 
above and the fact that Deleuze explicitly aligns his theory of time with Berg-
son’s? Since we are especially interested in examining the relationship between 
6 H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, English trans. by A. Mitchell, New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1924 [1941], p. 11 [p. 11]
7 H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, English trans. by A. Mitchell, New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1924 [1941], p. 314-318 [p. 313-318]) See also: C1, pp. 3-4 [pp. 12-13]. 
8 C1, p. 4 [p. 13].
9 C1, p. 57 [p. 84]. According to Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty rejects cinema precisely because 
it detaches perception from its lived horizon, such that it presents a world devoid of reality, 
completely transparent and isolated. In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty does 
indeed write that the screen has no horizon and that the horizon makes things meaningful and 
gives them their identity (PP, p. 82). But there are other texts where Merleau-Ponty is far less 
negative towards cinema. Both in L’ontologie cartésienne et l’ontologie d’aujourd’hui and in the 
(still unpublished) course notes Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression, Merleau-Ponty 
suggests a convergence between cinema’s ontology and his own (later) endo-ontology. See M. 
Carbone, “Le philosophe et le cinéaste. Merleau-Ponty et la pensée du cinema,” in Chiasmi 
International 12 (2010), Merleau-Ponty. Philosophie et movement des images, pp. 47-70.
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Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze, we shall not examine whether or not Merleau-
Ponty’s and Deleuze’s views about Bergson’s theory of time square with Berg-
son’s texts. In other words, we shall not examine whether Merleau-Ponty’s 
and Deleuze’s interpretations of Bergson do his work justice. We shall instead 
limit ourselves to examining how Merleau-Ponty refers to Bergson in Phe-
nomenology of Perception and The Visible and the Invisible, the two key texts for 
Merleau-Ponty’s treatment and understanding of time. How does he attack 
Bergson’s conception of time and what does he propose as an alternative? As 
we compare Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Bergson with Deleuze’s, it will be-
come clear that what Merleau-Ponty sets forward as an alternative to Bergson 
corresponds in fact to what Deleuze finds in Bergson; thus  Deleuze’s distance 
to Merleau-Ponty is not as great as it might seem at first sight. 
Bergson in the Phenomenology of Perception
Merleau-Ponty brings up Bergson in the Phenomenology of Perception in 
the context of a discussion about the nature of the relation between language 
and thinking. Do we need a representation of a word in order to be able to 
speak it? Do we rely on acquired linguistic images when we speak? As this is 
a question about linguistic memory, and as memory is one of the ways we 
experience time, this discussion between Merleau-Ponty and Bergson is very 
useful for our inquiry.
Merleau-Ponty argues that it is a mistake to presuppose that a separate 
level of determinate representations of past experiences or facts serves as the 
pool wherein we search for our memories. We do not retrieve a memory by 
looking for similarities between the current linguistic context and our repre-
sentations of past ones. The study of several kinds of amnesia had revealed 
that people are quite capable of using stored knowledge without being able to 
make representations of that knowledge.10 Patients who suffer from aphasia, 
for example, scream, “Ah, a mosquito!,” when they are bitten in the arm. And 
yet, they are unable to retrieve the word from their memory when asked to 
name the flying insect that bit them. 
Secondly, if remembering a word were synonymous with looking for simi-
larities between a particular linguistic situation and previous ones, the success 
of the operation would boil down to sheer luck. A present situation can look 
like a previous one in a thousand ways; every situation resembles an old one in 
one way or another. In short, a theory anchored to the notion of a database of 
representations of past experiences does not explain how similarities are being 
determined, and thus simply replaces one mystery with another.
10 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, English trans. by C. Smith, London/
New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962 [1945], pp. 174-175 [pp. 203-204]. Hencefor-
ward abbreviated as PP.
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Merleau-Ponty does not think that the act of remembering entails search-
ing into remote areas of our consciousness; our past, on the contrary, is always 
already with us. Merleau-Ponty here draws upon Husserl’s theory of reten-
tions and protentions: the past and the future do not consist of a succession of 
external ‘now’ instances, that have either passed or are to be expected, but they 
are enveloped in the living present11. When we perceive a situation, we always 
experience it against, or, more correctly, through the horizon of our past expe-
riences. Somebody’s perception of a dog, for example, might always be shaped 
by her memory of having been bitten by one once. Moreover, the memory of 
this past event is not restricted to the characters present at the biting incident, 
but spreads out to her entire past.Her seeing of the dog now before her is thus 
shaped not only by her memory of the dangerous dog of her past, but also by 
hermemory of that dog’s owner, of herrelationship with the owner, of perhaps 
the romantic setting theywere in, etc. Her entire past, in other words, is con-
centrated in her present perception.12 
Moreover, Merleau-Ponty adds that remembering is not a representational 
matter. When we need to recall a word, for example, it is not so much the 
meaning of what we would like to say that guides us towards the word we 
are looking for, but the tone of the current context and of the word we are 
searching for. It is the “emotional essence” we have retained of the word, the 
way it is pronounced and the style of its sound that will shape the word in our 
11 In The Time of Half-Sleep: Merleau-Ponty between Husserl and Proust, Mauro Carbone 
convincingly demonstrates how Merleau-Ponty’s conception of time undergoes a fundamental 
change in The Visible and the Invisible. Whereas Phenomenology of Perception was still marked by 
Husserlianism—in the sense that it eventually fell back on the duality of a transcendent con-
sciousness versus its object—The Visible and the Invisible renounces this sort of transcendence 
and replaces it with the transcendence of flesh, its thickness, its being at a distance, its being 
visible-invisible. The sense of time, instead of being constituted through “a series of intentional 
acts, which present the link between past and present as adhesion of the consciousness of the 
past to the consciousness of the present” (p. 9), is now generated out of the differentiations that 
take place in the spatializing-temporalizing vortex itself (the flesh), out of its being enveloping-
enveloped. Thus, the retentions no longer refer to the intentional act of consciousness but to 
the operative intentionality within being itself. In addition, Merleau-Ponty not only supple-
ments Husserl’s continuity thesis with the idea of the constitutive value of discontinuity(for 
example, forgetting is understood as a condition for an access to the past) he also renounces the 
linearity and seriality present in Husserl’s conception of time. (M. Carbone, The Thinking of the 
Sensible. Merelau-Ponty’s A-Philosophy, Evanston/Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 2004, 
pp. 1-13) According to Fabrice Colonna, the anti-Husserliantheory of time of The Visible and 
the Invisible is fundamentally influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Bergson. (F. Colonna, 
“Merleau-Ponty et la simultanéité,” in Chiasmi International 4 (2002), Merleau-Ponty. Figures 
et fonds de la chair, p. 216) 
12 “The objective landmarks in relation to which I assign a place to my recollection in the 
mediatory identification, and the intellectual synthesis generally, have themselves a temporal 
significance only because gradually, step by step, the synthesis of apprehension links me to my 
whole actual past” (PP, p. 418 [p. 478], italics mine).
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mouths.13 Memory, consequently, is not a function of representational think-
ing but of a bodily being-towards-the-world in which the past is not relegated 
to a remote area but is always interacting, in its entirety, with what we do and 
see here and now. 
Where is Bergson in these observations? Merleau-Ponty himself credits 
Husserl, but the similarities with Bergson are unmistakably clear both in the 
idea of the simultaneity of past and present and in the idea of the present as a 
contraction of the past in its entirety. Merleau-Ponty acknowledges Bergson’s 
influence when he discusses how memory-images are elicited by the current 
situation and its specific sensory-motor interest. But—and this is interesting 
for us - he accuses Bergson of not being radical enough. The current situation 
is only the empirical trigger for the memories, while the transcendental origin 
of these memories is situated in a transcendent order: that of the pure past. In 
Bergson’s account, the practical, current situation is not necessary to actualize 
the pure past: 
[…] the verbal image is only one of the modalities of my phonetic gesticula-
tion, presented with many others in the all-embracing consciousness of my 
body. This is obviously what Bergson means when he talks about a “motor 
framework” of recollection, but if pure representations of the past take their 
place in this framework, it is not clear why they should need it to become 
actual once more.14 
As Fabrice Colonna puts it, Merleau-Ponty thinks Bergson does not rec-
ognize the transcendent moment in the present itself. Bergson doubles the 
present with a virtual layer, the pure past, such that both layers are extrinsic 
to one another.15 It is not clear, in other words, how the virtual past and the 
actual present are linked in Bergson. Merleau-Ponty, for his part, anchors the 
pure past in the present by relying on the notion of depth developed by Er-
win Straus. Straus says that when we perceive something as being far away, 
13 PP, p. 180 [p. 210].
14 PP, p. 181 [p. 210-211].
15 “Because he adheres to the presupposition of presence, Bergson fails to recognize the 
present’s essential distance, and this leads him to redouble the present with the virtual shadow 
of the past, instead of thematizing its transcendence. […] While Bergson sees the present’s 
constitutive split as a redoubling, Merleau-Ponty sees it as a dehiscence. Merleau-Ponty rejects 
the notion of the present that is weakened into the past (empiricism), and the notion that the 
present is different in nature from the past that redoubles it (Bergson). He posits a present that 
is already transcendence, distance, a present that can harbor the past, the imaginary, the dream, 
the phantasm. The past is already the past of the present it had been, but not because there is 
a “consecutive image” of the present—that is to say, once again, a limit between present and 
past—but for the more fundamental reason that the present is not a positive presence—the 
present is always already other.” (F. Colonna, “Merleau-Ponty et la simultanéité,” in Chiasmi 
International 4 (2002), Merleau-Ponty. Figures et fonds de la chair, p. 218, transl. mine).
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we do not rely only on a spatial intuition—how many steps removed from it 
are we?—but also on a temporal one: the thing is perceived as being far away 
because we have to  make an effort to reach it in the future, or because we 
have left it behind in the past. As a result, the present perception of a remote 
object always exceeds the dimension of the present and spills over into the 
past and the future. It is a spatial perception that is always already temporal 
or vice versa. By situating the origin of memories in the pure past, thus effec-
tively refusing to give time a spatial inscription, Bergson reduces the past to a 
powerless, immaterial dimension.16 According to Colonna, that explains why 
Merleau-Ponty, despite his sympathy for Bergson’s attempt to find a notion 
that could account for non-presence in the present or, in other words, for the 
presence of the past in the present, does not take over Bergson’s notion of the 
virtual, but instead replaces it with “simultaneity” or “flesh.”
Does Merleau-Ponty’s criticism on Bergson hold? If we take Deleuze as our 
guide to reread Bergson’s Matter and Memory, then we cannot but conclude 
that it does not. Let us divide Merleau-Ponty’s criticism into two parts, analo-
gous to the twofold structure of his alternative account of linguistic memory, 
and approach their refutation one at a time.
To begin with, Deleuze’s reading of Bergson insists that Bergson’s pure 
past cannot be regarded as transcendent with respect to the actual present. 
The well-known figure Bergson offers in chapter three of Matter and Mem-
ory17—an inverted cone that specifies the present as a concentration of the 
virtual past—clearly suggests a continuity between pure memory (pure or vir-
tual past), memory-image and actual perception.18 A memory that has been 
16 M. Merleau-Ponty, Notes de cours 1959-1961, Paris: Gallimard, 1996, p. 199.
17 “Perception is never a mere contact of the mind with the object present; it is impregnated 
with memory-images which complete it as they interpret it. The memory-image, in its turn, 
partakes of the “pure memory,” which it begins to materialize, and of the perception in which it 
tends to embody itself: regarded from the latter point of view, it might be defined as a nascent 
perception. Lastly, pure memory, though independent in theory, manifests itself as a rule only 
in the coloured and living image which reveals it.” (H. Bergson, Matter and Memory, English 
trans. by N.M. Paul and W.S. Palmer, New York: Dover Publications, 2004 [1939], p. 170 [p. 
147]) See also G. Deleuze, Cinema 2. The Time-Image, English trans. by H. Tomlinson & R. 
Galeta, London: The Athlone Press, 1989 [1985], p. 279 footnote 4 [p. 65]. Henceforward 
abbreviated as C2.
18 C2, pp. 284-285 [p. 108]. Ronald Bogue explains Bergson’s scheme as follows: “Bergson 
visualizes the virtual past as a cone, with its point representing the past’s coincidence with the 
present, and its widening volume representing the ever-growing expanse of coexisting past 
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recollected and has become an actual perception is the result of the focusing 
and contracting of the cloudy pure past or pure memory.19 Pure memory or 
pure past is thus not separated from the memory-images that are actualized 
into perceptions or representations. And the pure past, because it needs these 
actualizations to have any relevance, is not of a higher order than perceptions 
and memory-images. That is not to say, however, that perceptions, memory-
images and the pure past are the same thing. Their practical mingling not-
withstanding, for Bergson, they are different in nature. Deleuze translates this 
immanent difference by calling the actual (perception) as well as the virtual 
(pure past) real. Both have ontological power, both create being—but not in 
the same way. The virtual is the driving force behind any kind of movement; 
indeed, the virtual is the power of creation: it is the endless play of differences 
itself. The actual, conversely, delineates and arrests the virtual into determinate 
forms. We will come back to this when responding to the second criticism.
Merleau-Ponty’s second criticism is that Bergson’s account of the past is 
essentially modeled on the image of present representations of the past. In so 
doing, “he makes time out of a preserved present, and evolution out of what 
events. In that our past is preserved within itself and surges forward into the present, we can say 
that each present moment is a contraction of the past, a concentration of the entire cone in the 
point of its apex. Conversely, the endless expanse of the past may be regarded as a dilation of 
the present, the cone’s spreading volume issuing forth from the apex of each present moment.” 
(R. Bogue, Deleuze on Cinema, New York/London: Routledge, 2003, p. 136) 
19 In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the movement of actualization of a percep-
tion or representation out of pure memory is compared to the movement of a telescope: at first 
you see nothing or, which is the same, a nebula (pure memory precedes images; it is uncon-
scious); then you rotate the rings that control the lenses in the telescope, at which point singular 
images of stars come into focus. This is the stage of fragmentation, the movement from unity 
to multiplicity and from multiplicity to juxtaposition. A second stage is needed: contraction. 
The images of the constellation must be narrowed, brought down the tube so that they fit into 
my eye. That is the movement from singular images to generalities, the very movement upon 
which actions can be based (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bergson/). See also G. Deleuze, 
Bergsonism, trans. H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam, New York, Zone Books, 1988 [1966], pp. 
86-89 [pp. 88-91]) Henceforward abbreviated as B..
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is evolved.”20 To put the problem in Deleuzean terms: Merleau-Ponty thinks 
Bergson conceives of the condition in terms of the conditioned; he thinks the 
virtual by analogy with the actual. Deleuze approves of rejecting any philoso-
phy that confuses the actual and the virtual, but he does not believe Bergson 
is guilty of this philosophical crime. Indeed, if Deleuze is so interested in 
Bergson, it is precisely because, according to him, Bergson offers a way out of 
tracing the condition from that which is conditioned. How is that? 
Traditionally, the condition is thought after what is already there. We be-
gin with what is, the real, and then proceed retrospectively to deduce what 
should have been the possibilities. The possible is then identified as the condi-
tion out of which the real develops itself. As such, the possible and the real are 
not fundamentally different: the real and the possible are the same, except for 
a surplus of existence on the side of the real. The real is a realized possibility. 
This conception of the condition makes it impossible to account for the ap-
pearance of something radically new, for one can only think in terms of what 
already is—one cannot capture the singularity of the real.21 Ultimately, this is 
not only a static, but also conservative image of the world, one where time is 
of no real influence. It reduces time to being the theoretical framework where 
the ideally possible develops into actual existence. Time is, as such, extrinsic 
to the event of realization: it has no proper ontological reality.22
Bergson, however, not only believes that something new can arise, he also 
believes that this happens all the time. The new, for him, is not prefigured, in 
one way or another, by the old. This implies that the creation, the emergence 
of something new, cannot be seen as the evolution in time of something al-
ready present into something different. It has to be seen, instead, as the evolu-
tion of time itself. Time, in other words, is not the container wherein events 
take place: it is itself the taking place of events. It is the production of qualita-
tive differences, and not of quantitative variation. Within this conception of 
time as the production of qualitative differences, the emergent thing must be 
thought as a stagnation or a pause in the process of production. It must be 
thought as a (temporary) result of the process of differentiation, as something 
differentiated. Time is thus the condition out of which the created thing can 
evolve. As time is not made out of actual things, but is instead the becoming 
20 PP, p. 415 footnote 1 [pp. 474-475] 
21 B, p. 96-99 [p. 99-101])
22 “(...) time has no proper ontological reality whatsoever, since it would only be the frame-
work wherein events happen, of which time has no grip on its possibilities, and if time does 
not do anything, according to Bergson, it is nothing.” (P. Marrati, “Le nouveau en train de se 
faire. Sur le bergsonisme de Deleuze,” in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, n° 3, 2007, p. 263, 
transl. mine). 
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of which actual things are crystallizations, it cannot be said to be conceived 
starting from what it conditions.23
There is a second argument why Bergson cannot be accused of deducing 
the pure past from the determinate representations of that past. When we 
consider that the determinate allows for juxtaposition, we see that the accu-
sation would imply that Bergson conceives time spatially, i.e., as the succes-
sion of actual presents, as the container wherein determinate, homogeneous 
elements are juxtaposed. The following passage shows that Merleau-Ponty is 
thinking precisely along such lines: 
Successives do not make a line: where would we align them? This not only 
means (Bergson) that the spatial symbolization of time transforms time, de-
forms it, substitutes the exterior for the interior, division for indivision, such 
that one would have to find anew [a] contact with “fusion” and “interpenetra-
tion’; [it also means that] this would still be series, but an immaterial series. 
And the critique holds for every series, be it spiritual or spatial.24 
Bergson’s well-known critique of a spatial conception of time and the al-
ternative he puts forward are not enough, according to Merleau-Ponty. He 
writes: “In order to arrive at authentic time, it is neither necessary nor suf-
ficient to condemn the spatialization of time as does Bergson.”25 Bergson’s 
critique is not necessary: this is so simply because a spatial conception of time 
23 The notion of crystallization in this sentence is not a direct reference to Deleuze’s notion 
of the crystal image (Cinema 2. The Time-Image). It resonates, rather, with the notion of con-
traction that Deleuze uses to describe the relation between the Bergsonian couple, the virtual 
and actual: matter (actual) is duration (virtual) that has been “infinitely slackened and relaxed,” 
such that “its moments are placed outside one another” and one moment can appear when 
another one has disappeared (B, p. 86 [p. 89]). It was in order to stress the non-resemblance 
between the virtual and the actual that I replaced “contraction” with “crystallization,” a pro-
cess that presupposes a continuity between its two poles, but is also characterized by a radical 
change of form. In Bergsonism, this change is described in terms of a dismantling of virtual 
coexistence. In the actual, the Whole is expressed in a specific way, according to a particular 
aspect or point of view, such that the different expressions are distinguished from one another 
(B, pp. 100-101 [pp. 104-105]) 
24 “Les successifs ne font pas une ligne: où les alignerions-nous? Ceci ne veut pas dire seule-
ment (Bergson): la symbolisation spatiale du temps le transforme, le déforme, c’est l’extérieur 
substitué à l’intérieur, la division à l’indivision, de sorte qu’il faudrait retrouver [un] contact 
avec [la] ‘fusion’ et ‘l’interpénétration’: ce serait encore série, simplement immatérielle; la cri-
tique porte sur toute série, spirituelle aussi que spatiale.” (M. Merleau-Ponty, Notes de cours 
1959-1961, Paris: Gallimard, 1996, p. 199, transl. mine).
25 Merleau-Ponty continues: “It is not necessary, since time is exclusive of space only if we 
consider space as objectified in advance, and ignore that primordial spatiality which we have 
tried to describe, and which is the abstract form of our presence in the world. It is not sufficient 
since, even when the systematic translation of time into spatial terms has been duly stigmatized, 
we may still fall very far short of an authentic intuition of time. This is what happened to Berg-
son.” (PP, p. 415 footnote 1 [pp. 474-475])
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is not necessarily problematic, provided, of course, that space be understood 
as depth, as a primordial bodily presence towards the world that is always in 
excess of itself. And his critique is not sufficient because it does not imply that 
one actually has an “authentic intuition of time”; a negative knowledge of 
time does not necessarily imply a positive knowledge of it. 
Merleau-Ponty is essentially unfair in his polemic against Bergson. He 
blames Bergson for not considering other kinds of spatiality in order to think 
time. And yet, the spatiality Merleau-Ponty advances meets all the require-
ments Bergson mentions with respect to the conception of time. Space, in 
Merleau-Ponty as in Bergson, is not a homogeneous container wherein de-
terminate, objective identities are juxtaposed; it is, instead, a quality in which 
everything is comprised of everything. This means that what is not actually 
perceivable (for example, the end of the street I am looking at through my 
window) is nevertheless equally present in an actual spatial perception (for 
instance, my perception of the street). Every spatial perception thus already 
carries within it what has previously been perceived and what is still to be per-
ceived. All of this perfectly matches the continuity and the qualitative charac-
ter of time that Bergson discusses.
Bergson in The Visible and the Invisible
Bergson occupies a central place in Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on time in 
The Visible and the Invisible: the concept of “partial coincidence”, crucial to 
Merleau-Ponty’s argument, is one he borrows from Bergson. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, it is impossible to recall the past as it was: 
our present cannot coincide with the being of the past; every memory bears 
the traces of our search for it. Were this not the case, we would be unable 
to distinguish the past from the present. This is not to say, however, that a 
memory is nothing but a trace, i.e., a construction without any inscription of 
the past. For that would mean, first, that there is in fact no past, only a pres-
ent, and, hence, that there is no access to the past, but only to the present. 
Merleau-Ponty believes that we can only partially coincide with the past; this 
coincidence, he says elsewhere, has always already happened or is always about 
to happen—but never actually happens. As such, the past we appeal to is an 
impossible past, a past that has never been “present”.26 It is “the past such as 
it was one day plus an inexplicable alteration, a strange distance—bound in 
26 “Hence reflection does not itself grasp its full significance unless it refers to the unreflec-
tive fund of experience which it presupposes, upon which it draws, and which constitutes for 
it a kind of original past, a past which has never been a present.” (PP, p. 242 [p. 280]) And: “It 
is a coincidence always past or always future, an experience that remembers an impossible past, 
anticipates an impossible future, [...].” (M. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, English 
trans. by A. Lingis, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968 [1964], pp. 122-123 [p. 
164]) Henceforward abbreviated as VI. 
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principle as well as in fact to a recalling that spans that distance but does not 
nullify it.”27 
Merleau-Ponty embraces this very Bergsonian idea (as does Deleuze, in-
cidentally28), and yet he accuses Bergson of having failed to realize that the 
impossibility of a complete coincidence with the past is, paradoxically, the 
opening to the past.29 Merleau-Ponty’s argument anticipates the analysis of 
sensation he will develop later, in The Visible and the Invisible: it is impossible 
to have, simultaneously, a sensation of the touching of one’s hand and of the 
being touched of one’s hand. One always switches positions, and this chiasm 
is what makes access to the world of the touched things, the “objective” world, 
possible. Similarly, the divergence (écart) that separates us from the past as it 
was is also our way of access to the past. This is not simply a matter of fact, but 
a matter of principle.30 The “partial coincidence” is not so much a regrettable 
side effect of our human condition but the condition of possibility and the 
condition of reality of memory. Bergson, Merleau-Ponty argues, underesti-
mated the constitutive power of the divergence (écart), of the hollow character 
of being, of non-being31.
Can we agree with this criticism of Bergson? Is it true that Bergson does 
not attribute any constitutive power to the non-coincidence with the pure 
past? Is its different nature, its indeterminate, non-signifying character, really 
not a positive characteristic? 
Deleuze argues that it is. For him, the non-representational nature of the 
virtual is a constitutive characteristic because it allows the endless stream of 
actualizations to continue. It is exactly because the virtual can never be ex-
hausted by the sum of its actualizations or representations, regardless of their 
infinite number, that the drive to actualize or represent is maintained.32 These 
actualizations are necessary because they shape the virtual—they prevent 
it from being an empty form. In Merleau-Pontyan terms: the past must be 
27 VI, p. 124 [pp. 165]. 
28 “The ground then appears as an immemorial Memory or pure past, a past which itself 
was never present.” (G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, English trans. by P. Patton, London/
New York: Continuum, 2004, [1968], p. 343 [p. 351]) 
29 “Like the philosophies of reflection, what Bergson lacks is the double reference, the 
identity of the retiring into oneself with the leaving of oneself, of the lived through with the 
distance.” (VI, p. 124 [p. 165]) 
30 “It is therefore necessary that the deflection (écart), without which the experience of the 
thing or of the past would fall to zero, be also an openness upon the thing itself, to the past 
itself, that it enter into their definition. “ (VI, p. 124 [p. 165])
 31 “In short: nothingness (or rather non-being) is hollow and not hole. The open, in the 
sense of a hole, that is Sartre, is Bergson, [...].” (VI, p. 196 [p. 249]) 
32 “It [the pure past] cannot be represented, but without it there is no representation pos-
sible.” (C.V. Boundas, “Deleuze-Bergson: an Ontology of the Virtual,” in P. Patton (ed.), De-
leuze: a Critical Reader, Oxford/Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996, p. 93) 
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anchored to the present, and this can only happen in the form of a past with 
which we only partially coincide. 
In this context, it is remarkable that both Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty use 
the image of opposing mirrors to illustrate the non-coincidence of the condi-
tion. Merleau-Ponty writes that, just as it is impossible to trace the origin of 
the image when two mirrors are set opposite one another, so too it is impos-
sible to identify the origin of our memories.33 In one sense, this origin is the 
pure past, but, as we cannot coincide with it and are always directed towards 
the concrete representations partially covering it, the latter, too, can be re-
garded as the origin. Deleuze turns to the figure of two opposing mirrors in 
the context of the crystal-image and of the discussion of the indiscernability 
of the actual and the virtual in that direct image of time. In a movie, the mir-
ror image is virtual with regards to the actual person whose image is reflected 
in the mirror, but it is actual with regards to the person who is being driven 
outside the mirror image and thus being virtualized.34 
To sum up: both Merleau-Ponty and Bergson (as he is presented and cop-
ied by Deleuze)  believe that the pure past has to be understood as something 
we can never have access to with our representational instruments; it can only 
be present to or accessed by a kind of thinking that recognizes the indiscern-
ability of the actual and the virtual, as Bergson and Deleuze contend, or by a 
form of thinking that acknowledges the transcendence in itself of the actual, 
as Merleau-Ponty claims.35 The latter thinking  values these “holes” as the di-
rect presence of the transcendental condition—the pure past. The resonances 
we touched upon in the course of this discussion – i.e. those regarding the 
simultaneity of past and present and those with respect to the idea of partial 
coincidence - indicate that Merleau-Ponty could have found an ally in Berg-
son instead of an “opponent.” Bergson’s notion of “partial coincidence” could 
in fact be read as endorsing Merleau-Ponty’s notion of immanent transcen-
dence. More generally, we can say that, had Merleau-Ponty focused on the 
Bergsonian concepts Deleuze uses, a different Bergson would have appeared, 
perhaps even a Bergson not in need of as much “correction” as Merleau-Ponty 
likes to present it. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty’s alternative to Bergson is not as 
different from what we find in Bergson as Merleau-Ponty’s presentation of it 
would have us think. 
The not-all-too-deep water
Let us now return to the question we raised in response to Deleuze’s refer-
ence, in The Movement-Image, to phenomenology in general and to Merleau-
Ponty in particular. Is Deleuze’s description of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of time 
33 VI, p. 139 [p. 184] 
34 C2, p. 68 [pp. 94-95].
35 VI, p. 184 [p. 238], p. 195 [p. 249] 
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correct? Does Merleau-Ponty really see time as the neutral frame one must 
presuppose in order to think the transition of one existentially-fixed Gestalt to 
another? Is it the case that time in Merleau-Ponty has no ontological reality, 
no intrinsic relation to the things that move and to the way they move?
We should note  from the outset that Merleau-Ponty’s conception of time 
relies heavily upon some crucial Bergsonian insights. Just like Bergson, Mer-
leau-Ponty pits against the explanation of the passing of time in terms of a suc-
cession of now-moments the simultaneity of present and past: “The definition 
of time [...] which might be formulated as “a succession of instances of now” 
has not even the disadvantage of treating past and future as present: it is in-
consistent, since it destroys the very notion of “now’, and that of succession.”36 
And, again like Bergson, Merleau-Ponty believes that the present does not 
reach out towards a resembling past experience, but to the past in its entirety. 
Finally, Merleau-Ponty, like his predecessor, believes time to be the only eter-
nity possible: the only thing that remains the same throughout all becoming 
and change is the fact of changing itself.37 Time is that which accounts for all 
differences by being itself nothing more than differentiation.38 Merleau-Ponty 
even uses Bergsonian metaphors, such as contraction and concentration, in 
order to explain the relation between time and its different actualizations.39
Together, these elements show that Merleau-Ponty cannot easily be assimi-
lated to the group of philosophers who think time to be a neutral container.
But how to understand the crucial difference Fabrice Colonna identifies 
between Merleau-Ponty and Bergson? Colonna argues that Merleau-Ponty 
develops his notion of depth in response to the extrinsic relation between 
the virtual past and the actual present in Bergson—as Merleau-Ponty reads 
him. Depth perception indicates that the present itself always reaches out 
towards other dimensions. Present and past are not merely related to one an-
other as layers, as  Bergson’s metaphor suggests. According to Merleau-Ponty, 
36 PP, p. 412 [pp. 471-472]. See also PP, p. 421 [p. 481]. 
37 Merleau-Ponty compares the unity of time with the unity of a fountain jet: there is one 
jet of water although the water changes. (PP, p. 421, [p. 482]) In Notes de cours, Merleau-Ponty 
uses the Nietzschean notion of the eternal recurrence to describe the ceaseless creation of the 
new. (M. Merleau-Ponty, Notes de cours 1959-1961, Paris: Gallimard, 1996, p. 209). The no-
tion of the eternal return also plays a crucial role in Deleuze’s philosophy of difference (see for 
example, G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, English trans. by P. Patton, London/New York: 
Continuum, 2004, [1968], p. 153 [p. 164]). 
38 “What is perfectly clear, is that this primordial temporality is not a juxtaposition of ex-
ternal events, since it is the power which holds them together while keeping them apart” (PP, 
p. 422 [p. 483]). 
39 “C is the culmination of a long concentration which has brought it to maturity; as it was 
being built up, it made its approach known by progressively fewer Abschattungen, for it was 
approaching bodily. When it came into the present it brought with it its genesis, of which it 
was merely the ultimate expression (...). Time maintains what it has caused to be” (PP, p. 420 
[p. 480]).
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the present contains the past: past and present are intrinsic to one another, 
and not bordering on one another. According to Colonna, Merleau-Ponty 
signals his break with Bergson when he replaces the “virtual” with “simultane-
ity” and “flesh,” and “differentiation” with “bursting forth” (éclatement) and 
“dehiscence”.40 
We have tried to show that Merleau-Ponty’s dismissal of the hidden, tran-
scendent character of Bergson’s pure past is not justified. More accurately put: 
when we read Bergson through Deleuze, we see that there is little reason to 
say that Bergson neglects the transcendent moment in the present itself,41 or 
that he appeals to a layer transcendent to the present. However, as we have ap-
proached Bergson mainly through readings of his work, and as his own texts 
are often quite ambiguous, we cannot regard our argument as a proof that 
Merleau-Ponty has misread Bergson. What the discussion does show, how-
ever, is that Merleau-Ponty’s reworking of Bergson is not that different from 
Deleuze’s. It is rather surprising to see that, in Cinema 1: The Time-Image, De-
leuze refers to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of depth in the course of his discussion 
of depth of field as a filmic means to present a direct image of time. Deleuze 
picks up the notion Merleau-Ponty introduces as he attempts to tackle Berg-
son’s transcendent virtual, and incorporates it into his own theory, which is 
explicitly Bergsonian. 
Moreover, Colonna’s description of where Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
depth leads him brings Merleau-Ponty very close to Deleuze. Colonna sug-
gests that Merleau-Ponty’s big “discovery” is the insight that the combination 
of what Leibniz would regard as incompossible—present and non-present or 
past—results in movement. Consequentially, “flesh” or “simultaneity” only 
make sense as that which pushes difference forward, not by virtue of its own 
unity, but by virtue of its difference. Colonna concludes: 
This image of the stabilized bursting forth of Being makes Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy an ontology of Difference. Simultaneity is the ontological unity of 
difference […]. There is simultaneity, not in spite of difference, but because of 
difference. The difference is never different enough to cause a separation; its 
identity, however, is not posited at the outset as something apart, as something 
40 PP, p. 420 [p. 480]
41 Deleuze himself would, of course, never call this the transcendent moment within the 
present; he would be kept from such language by his attempt to develop an immanent philoso-
phy. Nevertheless, all the characteristics he attributes to the virtual—that it is non-representa-
tional, that it is differently determined than the actual, that it is non-chronological in character, 
etc.—sketch an image of the virtual as something that is not-actual, and thus something that 
transcends it. This transcendence, however, differs from a classical transcendence in that the 
virtual is situated within the actual. It is in this sense  legitimate for us to speak of an immanent 
transcendence. 
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whose integrity would be threatened by difference. On the contrary, identity 
is itself constituted through the movement of difference.42 
Hence the divergence in the way Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze refer to 
Bergson—the first, critically, the second, sympathetically—does not keep 
them from ending up on similar ground, namely on a quite Bergsonian inter-
est in the constitutive character of difference. In their philosophies, Merleau-
Ponty and Deleuze attempt to trace the origin of the highly differentiated 
character of the world without appealing to a unique, identical principle that 
is transcendent in relation to the world. Both end up with a kind of vitalism 
that cherishes creation and dynamism. I would like to suggest that Deleuze’s 
conceptual tools have a more solid basis for working out this philosophy of 
difference than those mobilized by Merleau-Ponty;a proper argument for this 
contention is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. .
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42 “Cette image de l’éclatement stabilisé de l’Etre fait de la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty 
une ontologie de la Différence. La simultanéité est l’unité ontologique de la différence (...). Il y 
a simultanéité non pas malgré la différence mais par la différence. La différence ne diffère jamais 
suffisamment pour qu’il y ait séparation, mais l’identité quant à elle n’est pas posée d’emblée à 
part, en sorte que la différence la mettrait en cause, mais elle se constitue à même le mouvement 
de la différence.” (F. Colonna, “Merleau-Ponty et la simultanéité,” in Chiasmi International 4 
(2002), Merleau-Ponty. Figures et fonds de la chair, p. 232, transl. mine). 
